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Abstract: This paper analyses the e¤ects of money shocks on macroeconomic aggregates in a
tractable exible-price, incomplete-markets environment that generates persistent wealth inequal-
ities amongst agents. In this framework, current ination redistribute wealth from the cash-rich
employed to the cash-poor unemployed and induce the former to increase their labour supply in
order to maintain their desired levels of consumption and precautionary savings. If the shocks
are persistent, however, they also raise ination expectations and thus deter the employed from
saving and supplying labour. We relate the strength of these two ination taxes to the underlying
parameters of the model and study how they compete in determining the overall sign and slope of
the implied output-ination tradeo¤relation.
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1 Introduction
The central feature of incomplete market economies is that the nancial wealth accumulated
by any agent depends on the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks that this agent has faced 
whether these shocks a¤ect labour incomes, trading opportunities, production possibilities,
preferences, etc. Monetary economies having this property thus naturally generate heteroge-
nous cash holdings in equilibrium. As is now well understood, in this context stochastic
lump-sum money injections that raise the price level redistribute wealth across agents and
have nonneutral e¤ects on real allocations (see Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986, and Berentsen
et al., 2005). In short, under heterogenous cash balances and lump sum injections an in-
tratemporal ination tax is at work that redistributes wealth within the period and is
ultimately responsible for the short-run nonneutrality of money.
By construction, monetary models belonging to the complete-markets, representative
agent tradition preclude such redistributive e¤ects. They do not imply, however, that money
shocks are neutral, even with perfectly exible prices. In such economies future ination re-
duces the expected return on accumulated cash balances and deters savings and labour sup-
ply (see, for example, Cooley and Hansen, 1989, on the cash-in-advance model; and Walsh,
2003: 2, on the money-in-the-utility model). Note that this nonneutrality mechanism relies
on expected rather than current ination and thus requires money growth shocks to display
some persistence. Hence these models can only feature an intertemporal ination tax, as
opposed to the intratemporal tax working through contemporaneous wealth redistribution.
This paper analyses the real e¤ects of aggregate monetary shocks within a tractable
exible-price, incomplete-markets environment where both the intratemporal and the in-
tertemporal ination taxes are operative and compete in determining the overall response
of current output and ination to nominal shocks a relation commonly referred to as the
output-ination tradeo¤, after Lucas (1973) and Ball et al. (1988).1 More formally, our
framework allows us to disentangle three potential e¤ects of monetary shocks on ination
and aggregates. First, we have an intratemporal ination tax, because monetary injections
redistribute wealth from relatively cash-rich households, who pay the tax, towards rela-
tively poorer households, who enjoy the corresponding subsidy; this induces the former to
1Note that this tradeo¤ di¤ers from the traditional notion of Phillips curve, which relates changes in
nominal wage growth or ination to changes in unemployment. While our model does generate positive
unemployment, the latter remains constant over time (i.e., individual labour supply, rather than labour
market participation, is time-varying.)
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replete their wealth by raising labour supply, which ultimately raises current output. The
intratemporal tax thus induces a positive output-ination relation, but for reasons that di¤er
sharply from traditional theories such as price stickiness (e.g., Ball et al., 1988) or imperfect
information (Lucas, 1973).
Second, the intertemporal tax is also at work, because persistence in the stochastic
process for money growth raises expected ination and discourages asset accumulation and
work, once a shock has occurred; this e¤ect induces negative, rather than positive, hours and
output responses to money growth shocks. Hence the actual slope of the output-ination
tradeo¤ is ultimately determined by the relative strengths of the intratemporal and intertem-
poral ination taxes, which notably depend on mean ination and the persistence of shocks
(through their e¤ects on the cross-sectional distribution of wealth.) In particular, su¢ ciently
high levels of mean ination and/or persistence may lead to a reversal of the slope of the
tradeo¤; and even this reversal does not occur, their mitigating e¤ect may severely limit the
economic stimulus induced by current ination.
Third, the two taxes are in general not independent, for the impact of the shock in
general depends on expectations about how taxes and subsidies will be distributed across
agents in the future. We isolate the interactions between the two taxes by considering
asymmetric injections, whereby a particular class of agents receives more newly issued money
than does the average agent. Consider, for example, the case where money injections are
both persistent and baised towards relatively poorer households. On the one hand, this
raises the intratemporal tax paid by the rich, which reinforces the output response to the
shock. On the other hand, this provides income insurance to the richer who may become
poorer in the futureand lowers their precautionary money demand; this e¤ect pushes them
to reduce their labour supply whilst at the same time increasing the nominal price impact
of the shock. Thus, while the overall impact of the bias on output is in general ambiguous,
current ination is all the more responsive to the shock that this bias is large conversely, a
bias favouring relatively richer agents raises money demand and is associated with a more
gradual impact of money shocks on ination.
We carry out our analysis within a Bewley-type monetary model, i.e., where money serves
as a short-run store of value allowing agents to self-insure against idiosyncratic income uc-
tuations. As was rst shown by Bewley (1980, 1983), this role for money arises naturally
in environments where insurance markets are missing and agents cannot borrow against
future income. In our model, idiosyncratic labour income risk is rooted in the transitions
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of individual households between employment, a status where they can freely choose the
labour supply they rent out to competitive rms, and unemployment, where households
receive a xed subsidy lower than equilibrium wage income. Householdsoptimal response
to this uninsurable income di¤erence is to vary precautionary wealth: the employed accu-
mulate wealth to provide for future consumption, while the unemployed dis-save to provide
for current consumption. While keeping track of heterogenous variations in asset holdings
stemming from the precautionary motive is intrinsically complicated and often intractable,
we ensure analytical tractability by constructing a Bewley model that endogenously gener-
ates a cross-sectional distribution with a nite number of wealth states. For example, in
our baseline equilibrium the wealth distribution has two states: all employed households
accumulate the same quantity of real money balances (i.e., regardless of their employment
history), while unemployed households all end the current period with zero wealth (i.e., the
borrowing constraint forces them to liquidate their cash positions, regardless of their em-
ployment history). While we mostly focus on this class of equilibria here, we also show how
this approach to limiting cross-sectional heterogeneity can be generalised to allow for more
than two wealth states by allowing gradual, rather than immediate, asset liquidation by
unemployed households. As far we are aware, these families of equilibria with simple cross-
sectional distributions are new to the heterogenous-agents literature and may, we hope, be
useful for the better understanding of the impact of other types of aggregate shocks under
imperfect income insurance.
Related literature. Our framework is related to several existing monetary models with het-
erogenous agents. Inasmuch as we are using the Bewley framework to generate cross-sectional
wealth dispersion, our analysis follows those of Bewley (1980), Scheinkman andWeiss (1986),
Kehoe et al. (1992), Imrohoroglu (1992), and Akyol (2004). All these contributions except
that of Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) focus on the optimal long-run ination rate (i.e., op-
timal deviations from the Friedman rule) and do not analyse the short-run non-neutrality
of money. There are at least three di¤erences between our work and that of Scheinkman and
Weiss (1986). First, they consider a two-agent model where changes in individual employ-
ment status are perfectly synchronised (i.e., agents switch roles as the idiosyncratic shock
occurs); in contrast, our model has unsynchronised changes in employment status. Second,
their model generates an innite-dimensional wealth distribution, which did not allow them
to derive the output-ination tradeo¤, let alone relate its size to the underlying deep para-
meters of the model as we do. Third, they only allow for i.i.d. aggregate shocks, while our
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goal is precisely to study how expected persistence may alter the impact of these shocks.
Given the lack of tractability of Bewley models with innite-state wealth distributions, an
alternative approach to the one we follow is to solve them computationally. However, com-
putational limitations have thus far limited the applicability of this approach to the study
of optimal steady-state ination, again leaving aside the analysis of the short-run e¤ects of
ination shocks (e.g., Imrohoroglu, 1992, and Akyol, 2004.)
The non-neutrality of ination working through wealth redistribution has been explored
in frameworks that are di¤erent from Bewley models but which also generate wealth disper-
sion in equilibrium. In particular, search-theoretic models, in which agents face idiosyncratic
trading opportunities and need cash to facilitate future trades, typically generate heteroge-
nous cash holdings see, for example, Green and Zhou (1999), Camera and Corbae (1999),
and Molico (2006). There is an interesting correspondence between these models and ours,
regarding both their assumptions (e.g., uninsurable, idiosyncratic shocks) and their implica-
tions (i.e., cross-sectional heterogeneity, nonneutrality of average money growth). One key
feature of the above-mentioned papers is that they have a quantity of money that grows
deterministically, rather than stochastically as in our model. Moreover, and as discussed
by Molico (2006), search-theoretic models generate large-dimensional heterogeneity unless
strong simplifying assumptions are made that make the distribution of money holdings de-
generate. In this respect, that our model allows us to gradually increase cross-sectional
dispersion (i.e., by adding more and more wealth states) hopefully o¤ers a good compromise
between large-dimensional and degenerate cross-sectional distributions.
Related to search models are multiple trading rounds models with or without matching
frictions, where idiosyncratic shocks render money holdings heterogenous in a particular
subperiod, but where periodic reinsurance reinstates the homogeneity of holdings by the
end of every date. While originally introduced by Lagos and Wright (2005) to measure the
welfare cost of (deterministic) lump-sum money injections, it was subsequently modied by
Berentsen et al. (2005) to allow for stochastic injections. Our model shares a number of
features with that of Berentsen et al. For example, both models have agents facing unin-
surable shocks and limited access to credit markets (both of which entails heterogenous
cash holdings), but who are allowed to periodically replete their wealth by going through a
working stage where labour supply is perfectly elatic (which drastically limits cross-sectional
heterogeneity.) A central feature of our model, however, is that not all agents can reinsure
at the end of the period, due to the persistence in idiosyncratic employment statuses. Con-
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sequently, wealth inequalities are carried over from one period to the next and we can study
how it is a¤ected by, and more generally interact with, persistent aggregate shocks. This
is in sharp contrast to Berentsen et al., where both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are
i.i.d. and the source of nonneutrality is static in nature.
Finally, within the overlapping-generations tradition, Doepke and Schneider (2006) have
recently looked at the aggregate e¤ects of inter-cohort redistribution and nd a negative
e¤ect of ination shocks on output in the short and medium runs; in contrast, our model
can generate a positive short-run relation between ination and output based on intra-cohort
wealth redistribution.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
spells out its optimality and market-clearing conditions. Section 3 derives our baseline, two-
wealth state equilibrium. Section 4 analyses the properties of the short-run output-ination
tradeo¤ generated by the model and how it is a¤ected by mean ination, the persistence
of shocks, and the possible asymmetries in money injections. Section 5 considers equilibria
with more than two wealth states, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Technology, market structure and uncertainty
The economy is populated by a large number of rms, as well as a unit mass of innitely-
lived households i 2 [0; 1], all interacting in perfectly competitive labour and goods markets.
Firms produce output, yt, from labour input, lt, using the CRS technology yt = lt; they thus
adjust labour demand up to the point where the real wage is equal to 1. There are two sources
of uncertainty about household income in the model: one relating to their employment status
and the other to the at money that they receive from the monetary authority.
Unemployment shocks. In every period each household can be either employed or unem-
ployed. We denote by it the status of household i at date t, where 
i
t = 1 if the household
is employed and it = 0 if the household is unemployed. Households switch randomly be-
tween these two states, with  = Pr(it+1 = 1
it = 1) and  = Pr(it+1 = 0it = 0);
(; ) 2 (0; 1)2 being the probabilities of staying employed and unemployed, respectively.
Given this Markov chain for individual states, the asymptotic unemployment rate is:
U = (1  ) = (2    ) : (1)
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Crucially, we limit the ability of households to diversify this idiosyncratic unemployment
risk away by assuming that it is uninsurable and that agents cannot borrow against future
labour income.
Money shocks. LetMt denote the nominal money supply at the end of date t,  t =Mt=Mt 1
the aggregate rate money growth, and Pt the nominal price level. Newly-issued money is
injected into the economy through lump sum transfers, with household i receiving a nominal
amount Ptit from the monetary authorities at date t. The implied aggregate real money
injection, t =
R 1
0
itdi, is related to money growth as follows:
t =
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
=
mt 1 ( t   1)
1 + t
; (2)
where mt Mt=Pt and t  Pt=Pt 1  1 denote real money supply and the ination rate at
date t, respectively. Our baseline assumption is that money injections are symmetric across
agents (i.e., it = t 8i); we depart from this assumption in Section 3.4, where asymmetric
injections based on employment status are considered.2 Finally, from the denition of  t the
law of motion for real money supply is
mt = mt 1 t= (1 + t) : (3)
2.2 Householdsbehaviour
The households instantaneous utility function is u (c)   l, where c is consumption, l is
labour supply,  > 0 a scale parameter, and where u is a C2 function satisfying u0 (c) > 0,
u00 (c) < 0 and  (c)   cu00 (c) =u0 (c)  1 8c  0 (i.e. consumption and leisure are not gross
complements). Fiat money is the only outside asset available and, since private borrowing
is prohibited, the only asset that households can use to smooth consumption. Employed
households (i.e. those for whom it = 1) choose their labour supply, l
i
t, at the current wage
rate (= 1), while unemployed households (i.e., for whom it = 0) earn no labour income but
a xed amount of home production,  > 0.3 Let M it denote the nominal money holdings of
2Our baseline assumption that tranfers are symmetric and lump sum follows much of the literature
on Bewley models (e.g., Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986; Kehoe et al., 1992; Imrohoroglu, 1992); it can be
justied on the grounds that monetary authorities are not su¢ ciently well informed to treat individual
agents di¤erently, as is discussed in Kehoe et al. (1992) and Levine (1991). However, Section 3.4 shows that
asymmetric injections generate non trivial e¤ects, both static and dynamic, of nominal shocks.
3Alternatively,  can be interpreted as an unemployment subsidy nanced through a compulsory lump-
sum contribution, e = U= (1  U), paid by all employed households and ensuring the equilibrium of the
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household i at the end of date t; and mit M it=Pt the corresponding real money holdings (by
convention, we denote by M i 1 the nominal money holdings of household i at the beginning
of date 0). Thus, household is problem is to choose consumption, cit, labour supply, l
i
t, and
real money holdings, mit so as to maximise E0
P1
t=0 
t (u (cit)  lit), with  2 (0; 1), and
subject to:
Ptc
i
t +M
i
t =M
i
t 1 + Pt
 
itl
i
t +
 
1  it

 + it

; (4)
cit; l
i
t; M
i
t  0: (5)
Equation (4) is the nominal budget constraint of household i at date t, while the last
inequality in (5) implies that agents cannot have negative asset holdings. The Lagrangian
function associated with household is problem, formulated in real terms, is:
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

u
 
cit
  lit + 'itmit + it mit 11 + t + itlit +  1  it  + it   cit  mit

;
where it and '
i
t are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers (we check below that the non-negativity
constraints on cit and l
i
t are always satised in the equilibrium under consideration). The
optimality conditions for this programme are :
u0
 
cit

= it; (6)
it =  if 
i
t = 1 and l
i
t = 0 if 
i
t = 0; (7)
u0
 
cit

= Et
 
u0
 
cit+1

1 + t+1
!
+ 'it; (8)
'tm
i
t = 0; (9)
lim
t!1
tu0
 
cit

mit = 0: (10)
Equation (6) denes household is marginal utility, while (7) and (8) are the intratemporal
and intertemporal optimality conditions, respectively. Equation (9) states that either the
borrowing constraint is binding for household i ('it > 0), implying that cash holdings are
zero (mit = 0), or the constraint is slack ('
i
t = 0) and the household uses real balances to
smooth consumption over time (mit  0). Finally, condition (10) is a transversality condition
that will always hold along the equilibria that we will consider.
unemployment insurance scheme in the steady state. In this case, steady-state labour supply and output are
higher than under the home-production interpretation (as working households attempt to o¤set the wealth
e¤ect of social-security contributions by increasing their labour income), but the dynamic behaviour of the
economy faced with aggregate uncertainty is unchanged.
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2.3 Market clearing
Equilibrium in the market for goods requires that, at each date, the sum of each type of
agents consumption be equal to total production, with the latter being the sum of individual
labour supplies and home production. On the other hand, equilibrium in the money market
simply requires that individual real holdings sum up to the aggregate real money supply. In
short, market clearing requires, for all t,Z 1
0
 
itl
i
t +
 
1  it



di =
Z 1
0
citdi and mt =
Z 1
0
mitdi;
where the summation operator
R
is over individual households.
An equilibrium is dened as sequences of individual consumption levels, fcitg1t=0, individ-
ual real money holdings, fmitg1t=0, individual labour supplies, flitg1t=0, i 2 [0; 1], and aggregate
variables, fyt;mt; tg1t=0, such that the optimality conditions (6)-(10) hold for every house-
hold i; and the goods and money markets clear, given the forcing sequence f tg1t=0.
In general, heterogenous-agent models such as that described above generate an innite-
state distribution of agent types, as all individual characteristics (i.e., agentswealth and
implied optimal choices) depend on the personal history of each agent. Our approach here
is to look for closed-form solutions characterised by nite numbers of households types and
wealth states. The simplest class of equilibria that we consider has exactly two wealth states
and four types of agents; we take it as a benchmark and analyse it extensively in the next two
Sections. We subsequently extend our study to allow for more wealth states and agent types.
In all of the cases, the derivation of the relevant class of equilibria involves three steps: rst,
we conjecture the general shape of the solution; second, we identify the conditions under
which the hypothesised solution results; and third, we set the relevant parameters (here the
productivity of home production) so that these conditions always hold along the equilibrium
under consideration.
3 Equilibria with two-state wealth distributions
In this Section we construct the simplest class of equilibria with cross-sectional heterogeneity:
that where the distribution of money holdings is two-state. In a nutshell, such equilibria
have the following characteristics: all currently employed households hold the same amount
of cash at the end of the period, which they hoard to self-insure against unemployment
risk; all currently unemployed households, on the other hand, face a binding borrowing
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constraint and thus end the period with no cash. Since each households type depends on
both their beginning-of-period and end-of-period wealth, it follows that households can be
of four di¤erent types only, depending on their employment status in the current period (on
which end-of-period balances depend) and that in the period before (which determines their
beginning-of-period balances). In short, while asymptotically no two agents have the same
histories of idiosyncratic income shocks, the length of personal history which determines
their type is of two periods only.
3.1 Conjectured equilibrium
We conjecture the existence of an equilibrium along which
't = 0 if 
i
t = 1 and m
i
t = 0 if 
i
t = 0; (11)
that is, one where no employed households are borrowing-constrained (so that they all store
cash to smooth consumption), while all unemployed households are borrowing-constrained
(and thus hold no cash). Consider rst the consumption level of an unemployed household
under this conjecture. If this household was employed in the previous period then, from (4)
and (11), their current consumption is:
cit = m
i
t 1= (1 + t) +  + t (> 0) ; (12)
On the other hand, from (4) the consumption level of unemployed households who were
already unemployed in the previous period is identical across such households and given by:
cuut = t +  (> 0) : (13)
We now turn to employed households. From (6) and (7), their consumption level is
identical across employed households and independent of aggregate history, i.e.,
ce = u0 1 () (> 0) : (14)
From equations (6)(8) and (11), the intertemporal optimality condition for an employed
household is  = Et
 
it+1= (1 + t+1)

. If this household is employed in the following
period, which occurs with probability , then it+1 =  (see (7)). If the household moves
into unemployment in the next period, then from (6) it+1 = u
0  cit+1, where by construction
cit+1 is given by (12). The Euler equation for employed households is thus:
 = Et


1 + t+1

+ (1  ) Et

u0

mit
1 + t+1
+  + t+1

 1
1 + t+1

: (15)
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Equation (15) summarises how persistent money shocks may a¤ect real money demand
by employed households. First, such shocks raise future ination, t+1. On the one hand,
this lowers the expected return on cash holdings, 1= (1 + t+1), and thus decreases real
money demand, mit; this is the usual intertemporal substitution e¤ect of the real interest
rate on savings. On the other hand, high future ination lowers future consumption in case
of a bad unemployment shock (see the mit= (1 + t+1) term in (15)), to which the agent
may respond by raising real money demand; this is the income e¤ect generated by changes
in the real interest rate. Under our maintained assumption that consumption and leisure
are not gross complements, the intertemporal substitution e¤ect dominates for any level of
unemployment risk and future ination always lowers real money demand. Finally, persistent
money shocks raise the expected transfer t+1, which increases future consumption in case
of bad idiosyncratic shock; this again goes towards lowering the need for self-insurance and
thus the demand for real balances.
Since equation (15) relates individual money demands, mit, to aggregate variables only, it
implies that all employed households wish to hold the same quantity of real balances, which
we now denote by met . We may thus rewrite equation (12), giving the consumption level of
unemployed households which were previously employed, as follows:
ceut = m
e
t 1= (1 + t) +  + t: (16)
The labour supplies of employed households depend on whether they were employed or
not in the previous period. Using Eqs. (4) and (14), these are respectively given by:
leet = c
e +met  met 1= (1 + t)  t; (17)
luet = c
e +met   t: (18)
In other words, when all unemployed households are borrowing-constrained and no em-
ployed household is, households can be of four di¤erent types, depending only on their current
and past employment statuses, with their personal history before t 1 being irrelevant. This
distributional simplication results from the joint assumption that all unemployed house-
holds liquidate their asset holdings (i.e., 8i 2 [0; 1] ; it = 0 ) mit = 0), while all employed
households choose the same levels of consumption and asset holdings due to linear disu-
tility of labour (i.e., 8i 2 [0; 1] ; it = 1 ) mit = met).4 We denote these four household
4Note that the property that working households all wish to hold the same quantity of end-of-period real
balances, thanks to quasi-linear preferences and unbounded labour endowment, is also in Berentsen et al.
(2005). In our model, however, only a subclass of households (the employed) are allowed to work and replete
their money wealth at the end of each period, while all agents are in theirs.
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types ee, eu, ue and uu, where the rst and second letters refer to the date t   1 and date
t employment statuses, respectively. Since our focus is on the way in which idiosyncratic
unemployment risk a¤ects self-insurance by the employed, we consider the e¤ect of changes
in  taking U in (1) as given (the implied probability of leaving unemployment is thus
 = 1  (1  ) (1  U) =U). We then write the asymptotic shares of household types as:
!ee =  (1  U) ; !eu = !ue = (1  ) (1  U) ; !uu = U   (1  ) (1  U) ; (19)
and we abstract from transitional issues regarding the distribution of household types by
assuming that the economy starts at this invariant distribution.
Given the consumption and labour supply levels of each of household type, goods-market
clearing now implies that:
!eeleet + !
ueluet + U = (1  U)ce + !euceut + !uucuut : (20)
In the equilibrium under consideration, which we assume to prevail from date 0 onwards,
unemployed households hold no money while all employed households hold the real quantity
met . Money-market clearing thus requires that
(1  U)met = mt: (21)
3.2 Existence conditions
The condition for the distribution above to be an equilibrium is that the borrowing constraint
does not bind for ee and ue households but always binds for both uu and eu households.
The constraint is not binding for employed households if the latter never wish to borrow.
Thus, interior solutions to (15) must always be such that:
met  0: (22)
On the other hand, the Lagrange multiplier 'it has to be positive when households are
unemployed, so that from (6)-(8) we must have it > Et
i
t+1= (1 + t+1). First consider
uu households, whose current consumption is just  + t (see (13)), and thus for whom
it = u
0 ( + t). These households remain unemployed with probability , in which case
they will also consume  + t in the following period and thus 
i
t+1 = u
0   + t+1 : They
leave unemployment with probability 1   and will then consume u0 1 () in the following
period, so that it+1 = u
0 (u0 1 ()) = . Thus, uu households are borrowing-constrained
12
whenever:
u0 ( + t) > Et
 
u0
 
 + t+1

1 + t+1
!
+ (1  ) Et


1 + t+1

: (23)
We now turn to eu households. Their current consumption is given by Eq. (16), so that
it = u
0  met 1= (1 + t) +  + t ; while, just like uu households, they will be either uu
or ue households in the following period. Thus, eu households are borrowing-constrained
whenever:
u0

met 1
1 + t
+  + t

> Et
 
u0
 
 + t+1

1 + t+1
!
+ (1  ) Et


1 + t+1

: (24)
If (22) holds then (24) is more stringent than (23), so (24) is a su¢ cient condition for
both uu and eu households to be borrowing-constrained. We show in Appendix A that
when  lies in a range ( ; +), where 0    < +, then both (22) and (24) hold for all
t  0, provided that aggregate shocks have su¢ ciently small support. Intuitively, for our
equilibrium to exist home production must be su¢ ciently productive to deter unemployed
households from saving, whilst at the same time being su¢ ciently unproductive to induce
positive precautionary savings by employed households.
3.3 Equilibrium dynamics
We are now in a position to derive the solution dynamics of our equilibrium with limited
wealth heterogeneity. Using (2), (3), (15) and (21), we can summarise the dynamic behaviour
of the economy by a single forward-looking equation, namely,
met = Et

met+1
 t+1

+
(1  ) 

Et

met+1
 t+1
u0

 +
met+1
 t+1
(U + (1  U)  t+1)

: (25)
Equation (25) determines the equilibrium dynamics of the real money balances held by
employed households, fmetg1t=0, as a function of the money growth sequence f tg1t=0, the
exogenous state variable here. Finally, we assume that  t has small bounded support [ ; +],
with   > .
All equilibrium variables at date t can be expressed as functions of met and  t only. For
example, substituting (2)(3) and (21) into (17)(18), we derive the following expressions
for the labour supplies of employed households, depending on their specic type:
leet = c
e + Umet

 t   1
 t

; luet = c
e +met

1 + U ( t   1)
 t

; (26)
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where leet ; l
ue
t > 0. Similarly, substituting (2)(3) and (21) into (13) and (16), the consump-
tion levels of unemployed households can be expressed as:
ceut =  +m
e
t

U + (1  U)  t
 t

; cuut =  + (1  U)met

 t   1
 t

: (27)
It is apparent from equations (26)(27) that money growth shocks can a¤ect real variables
either directly through changes in  t (inside each bracketed term), or indirectly through
their potential e¤ect on current real money demand, met (as given by equation (25)). For
reasons that will become clear shortly, we refer to the former and the latter channels as the
intratemporaland intertemporalination taxes, respectively.
4 Intratemporal vs. intertemporal e¤ects of monetary
shocks and ination taxes
4.1 The intratemporal ination tax
The intratemporal e¤ects of monetary shocks can be pinpointed in the case where money
growth is i.i.d., so that the current shock does not alter households expectations about
future ination. With i.i.d. aggregate shocks, the rst-order approximation to equation (25)
yields the following constant path for met :
5
met = m
e =
1 + 
1 + (1  U)

u0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

  

; (28)
where unindexed variables denote steady-state values (all of which are summarised in Ap-
pendix A). Two properties of me are worth mentioning at this point. First, me falls with
, as less idiosyncratic unemployment risk reduces employed householdsincentives to self-
insure against this risk. Second, under our maintained assumption that  (c)  1; me falls
with  (this is proved in Appendix A): as ination increases, the return to holding real bal-
ances falls and money becomes less valuable as a self-insurance device against idiosyncratic
unemployment shocks.
We can now turn to the e¤ects of i.i.d. aggregate shocks on labour supply and output.
Equations (3) and (28) imply that t =  t   1. The individual labour supplies are thus:
leet = c
e +me

Ut
1 + t

; luet = c
e +me

1 + Ut
1 + t

: (29)
5This can be checked by linearising (25) around steady-state real balances and money growth, (me; ) ;
and solving the resulting equation forwards. That  (c)  1 implies that the equilibrium is unique and
non-cyclical, while i.i.d shocks preclude time-variations in real balances.
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The latter equations summarise the redistributive e¤ects of the current ination tax on
labour supplies. Note that leet rises but l
ue
t falls with t, following householdsadjustments
to the intratemporal wealth redistribution generated by ination. After an ination shock,
the households who pay the ination tax in period t are those who hold money at the
beginning of period t (ee and eu households), while the households who benet from the
corresponding ination subsidy are those who do not hold money at the beginning of period
t (ue and uu households). Consequently, ee households are hurt by the shock and increase
their labour supply to maintain their desired levels of consumption and money wealth, while
ue households can a¤ord to work less than they would have done had the shock not occurred.
From equations (19) and (29), market output, !eeleet + !
ueluet , is given by:
yt = (1  U) ce + (1  U)me

Ut + 1  
1 + t

: (30)
Market output increases with current ination (i.e. greater labour supply by ee house-
holds dominates the reduced labour supply of ue households) provided that U +  > 1, or
equivalently from (1), that +  > 1 (that is, the average persistence in employment status
must be su¢ ciently high). For small shocks, equation (30) can be approximated by the
following linear output-ination tradeo¤relation:
yt = y +  (t   ) ; (31)
where
 =
U +   1
(1 + ) (1 + (1  U))

u0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

  

: (32)
This tradeo¤ equation is reminiscent of those derived by Lucas (1973) or Ball et al.
(1988); however, the underlying mechanism that we emphasise here works very di¤erently.
In Lucas, agents raise production after an inationary money shock because they cannot
fully disentangle changes in relative prices from variations in the general price level; in Ball
et al., the output-ination tradeo¤ arises naturally from nominal rigidities. In contrast,
our model here features perfect information and fully-exible prices, but heterogenous cash
balances. Consequently, lump-sum monetary injections redistribute wealth from cash-rich to
cash-poor households, thereby inducing employed households to alter their labour supplies
in order to o¤set the implied wealth e¤ects. Interestingly, the model predicts that higher
trend ination lowers the impact of ination shocks on output (i.e., @=@ < 0), because it
lowers money holdings by employed households and thus mitigates the redistributive e¤ects
of these shocks. We may thus conclude that this negative relation is perfectly consistent with
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price exibility, contrary to the claim in Ball et al. (1988) that it supports the hypothesis
of nominal rigidities. We summarise the results obtained so far in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Steady-state real money holdings by employed households, me, increase
with idiosyncratic unemployment risk, 1   , and decrease with mean ination, . With
i.i.d. money-growth shocks, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for shocks to raise current
output is U +  > 1 (or, equivalently,  +  > 1), while the e¤ect of the shock on output is
stronger the lower is mean ination.
4.2 The intertemporal ination tax
Central to the transmission of monetary shocks here is the rôle, and determinants, of the real
money holdings held by the employed as a bu¤er against idiosyncratic unemployment risk.
Under i.i.d. money growth shocks, these holdings are constant over time as they are imme-
diately and entirely repleted by employed households (through variations in labour supply)
following a shock that redistributes current wealth. Obviously, this simple adjustment to ex-
ogenous disturbances is more complicated if current real money demand is itself a¤ected by
changes in expected ination, which is precisely what occurs when money growth shocks dis-
play persistence. In order to examine the e¤ect of auto-correlated aggregate shocks, assume
that money growth obeys the following AR(1) process:
 t = (1  )  +  t 1 + t; (33)
where  2 (0; 1) and ftg1t=0 is a white-noise process with zero mean and small bounded
support. Linearising (25) around the steady state, we obtain:
m^et = AEt
 
m^et+1
 BEt (^ t+1) ; (34)
where the hatted values denote proportional deviations from steady state (e.g., m^et =
(met  me) =me) and A and B are the following constants:
A  1  (1 +    ) (1  =c
eu) (ceu)
1 + 
2 (0; 1) ;
B  1  (1 +    ) (1  =c
eu) (ceu)
1 + 

U
1 + (1  U)

2 (A; 1) :
That A 2 (0; 1) implies that the equilibrium path generated by (33)(34) is unique (i.e.,
determinate); then, iterating (34) forwards under the transversality condition (10) yields:
m^et =  

B
1  A

^ t; (35)
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where B= (1  A) > 0. Equation (35) summarises the e¤ect of current money growth
on current real balances working through changes in future money growth (both relative
to the steady state). With autocorrelated shocks, a relatively high current ination tax on
employed households signals high future ination, thereby reducing the desirability of money
as a means of self-insurance and householdsincentives to supply labour to acquire it. To
see how such money demand adjustments alter the response of market output to monetary
shocks, use equations (2), (21) and (17)(18) again to write (30) in the following slightly
more general form:
yt = (1  U) ce + (1  U)met

U ( t   1) + 1  
 t

: (36)
Persistent money growth shocks lower met (because of the future ination taxes on real
money), but raise (U ( t   1) + 1  ) = t provided that U +  > 1 (through contempo-
raneous wealth redistribution). In other words, the e¤ect of future expected ination on
real money demand runs counter the e¤ect induced by intratemporal wealth redistribution.
Linearising equation (36) and using (35), we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2. Assume that money growth,  t, follows an AR(1) process with autocorrela-
tion parameter  2 (0; 1). Then, the higher is , the lower is the impact of monetary shocks
on output, while a necessary and su¢ cient condition for these shocks to raise output is:
U +   1
U + 1   >
B
1  A
Whether the latter condition holds or not ultimately depends on the deep parameters
that enter both sides of the inequality. When  ! 0, the analysis of the previous Section
applies and monetary shocks raise current output if and only if U +  > 1. However, as 
rises the intertemporal e¤ect becomes larger and reduces the impact of shocks, possibly (but
not necessarily) leading to a reversal in the sign of the tradeo¤ for large values of . Finally,
it is straightforward to show that a su¢ ciently high value of mean ination always lead to
the violation of this condition (and thus to a reversal in the tradeo¤ slope), as it tends to
mitigate the current ination tax (relative to expected ination taxes) following a persistent
monetary shock.
Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of a money growth shock on monetary
and aggregate supply variables. We set  = 0:95,  = 0:98,  = 0:6 and  = 1. We
interpret U as the share of borrowing-constrained households in the economy and set it
to 0.2 (e.g., Jappelli, 1990). The instantaneous utility function is ln c   l and the home
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production parameter  = 0:9+ (these parameters ensure that the existence conditions
stated in Section 3.2 are satised.)
Following a persistent shock, real money demand falls (due to the future ination taxes
expected by employed households), and ination jumps up. ee households persistently raise
their labour supply to o¤set the ination tax, while ue households reduce their labour supply
in response to the ination subsidy. Overall, the responses of labour supplies to the shock
imply that the latter persistently raises output; this is because the labour supply response
of ue households, although relatively large at the individual level, is actually small in the
aggregate (with  = 0:95, equation (19) implies that there are about 20 times as many ee
households as ue households.)
4.3 Asymmetric money injections
In order to analyse how expected ination taxes a¤ect householdsoptimal responses to the
current shock, we now study the distributional and aggregate implications of asymmetric
money injections. We can think of a number of reasons why money injections would be
biased towards some particular agents, rather than being symmetric. If the government uses
at money to nance a public unemployment insurance scheme, then unemployed households
as a group will receive more newly-issued money than what their share in the economy would
imply. Conversely, if money injections include a proportional component, then initially cash-
rich (i.e., previously employed) agents will receive more newly-printed money than under the
symmetric case.
In the context of our four-agent model, the simplest kind of asymmetric injection is that
where households are distinguished on the basis of their current employment status.6 We
thus assume that unemployed households receive a real injection ut = at, where a 2 [0; 1=U ]
and t is the aggregate injection dened by (2); by implication, employed households receive
et = bt, where b  (1  aU) = (1  U) (so that Uut +(1  U) et = t). Injections are biased
towards the unemployed (employed) when a > 1 (< 1). When a = 0, all newly-issued money
is handed out to the employed, while when a = 1=U it entirely benets the unemployed.
6We obtain close results when discrimination takes place over beginning-of-period wealth, rather than
employment status. We focus on the latter here because it is arguably more easily observable by the
government than the former.
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A. Equilibrium with two wealth states
B. Equilibrium with three wealth states
Figure 1. Level-deviations from the steady state of money growth, real money holdings,
equilibrium real balances (in the three-wealth state case), ination, labour supplies and
output, following a normalised, unexpected money growth innovation.
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We expect such asymmetries to alter both the intratemporal and the intertemporal non-
neutralities at work in the symmetric case. Consider the case where a > 1 (the reverse
reasoning applies when a < 1). On the one hand, this should generate a greater output re-
sponse to a one-o¤ money shock, as the intratemporal ination tax paid by the employed is
magnied, relative to the case where a = 1. On the other hand, such biased injections, inas-
much that they are expected to occur in the future when money shocks are persistent, should
lower the need for self-insurance by the employed and thus lower money wealth inequali-
ties and the implied impact of redistributive shocks. Overall, the way in which asymmetric
injections modify the output response to money shocks relative to the symmetric case will
depend on the relative strength of these two e¤ects.7
Let us start with the intratemporal e¤ect. First, we can compute output again, yt =
(1  U) ce + !eeleet + !ueluet , taking account of the fact that in (17)(18) the real injection is
bt rather than t. Then, using (2) and (21) and rearranging, we have:
yt = (1  U) ce + (1  U)met

aU ( t   1) + 1  
 t

; (37)
which is a generalisation of Eq. (36) allowing for biased money injections. Holding met con-
stant (i.e., assuming i.i.d. money growth shocks), a value of a that is greater (less) than 1
raises (lowers) the impact response of output to the shock. This is because this value of a is
associated with a higher (lower) ination tax paid by the employed, to which they respond
by increasing their labour supply more (less) than in the symmetric case. The e¤ect on
output is maximal at a = 1=U , while output is una¤ected by money injections when a = 0
(i.e., there is no ination tax paid by the rich when they receive all the newly-issued money.)
Let us know consider the intertemporal e¤ect, working through the dynamic adjustments
inmet that are induced by persistent money growth shocks. First, take (15) with at+1 instead
of t+1, use (2), (3) and (21) and rearrange to obtain the following dynamics for real money
7It is easy to show that the conditions for the existence of a four-agent equilibrium in the asymmetric-
injections case are similar to those in the symmetric case; namely, there always exists a range ( ; +),
with   < +, such that if  2 ( ; +) then employed households are never constrained while unemployed
households always are. More specically, from Eq. (38), steady state real money holdings by the employed
for any feasible value of a are:
me =
(1 + )
1 + a (1  U)

u0 1

 (1 +    )
(1  )

  

;
and thus me > 0 under condition (A2) in Appendix A. Combining (A2) with the requirement that eu
households be borrowing constrained gives condition (A5) which, as in the symmetric-injections case, always
holds for  >    1.
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demand :
met = Et

met+1
 t+1

+
(1  ) 

Et

met+1
 t+1
u0

met+1
 t+1
(1 + a (1  U) ( t+1   1)) + 

; (38)
which generalises Eq. (25). Then, linearising (38) and iterating the resulting expression
forwards as before, we nd that the impact response of current real money demand by the
employed, as a proportional deviation from the steady state, to a persistent real money
growth shock is given by:
m^et =  

B(a)
1  A

^ t; (39)
where A is as in Section 4.2 and B now depends on a as follows:
B(a)  1   (1 +    ) (1  a (1  U)) (1  =c
eu)
(1 + ) (1 + a (1  U)) :
As in the symmetric-injections case, the fall in the demand for real money balances by
employed households is all the more pronounced that money shocks are persistent (i.e.,  is
large). The fact that @B(a)=@a > 0 means that large values of a magnify this e¤ect even
more: as the bias in favour of the unemployed increases, the demand for self-insurance by
employed households falls for any given value of , thereby leading to a larger drop in their
real money demand. This e¤ect will work to reduce the response of yt to a  t-shock (see
(37)) as less inequalities in money holdings mitigate the impact of money shocks. Linearising
(37) and using (39), we nd that under asymmetric injections the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for money shocks to raise output is:
aU +   1
aU + 1   >
B(a)
1  A;
which may be compared to the inequality stated in proposition 2 above. Here the two e¤ects
just discussed are reected in the fact an increase in a raises both sides of the inequality, so
it is in general ambiguous whether it is higher or lower values of a, holding other parameters
constant, that are more likely to lead to a reversal in the slope of the tradeo¤.
Importantly, the way money injections are transmitted to nominal prices and ination
over time depends on the primary beneciaries of such injections. Substituting (39) into the
linearised versions of (3) and using (21), one nds the following approximation to current
ination:
t '  + ^ t   m^et + m^et 1 =  + C (a) ^ t +D (a) ^ t 1;
where
C (a)  1 + (B (a)  A)
1  A and D (a)   
B (a)
1  A:
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The coe¢ cient C (a) ( 0) measures the impact e¤ect of a money shock on ination;
after one period, we have that ^ t = ^ t 1 and thus t '  + (C (a)+D (a)) ^ t 1. C (a)
( 0) is increasing in a whereas C (a)+D (a) ( 0) is decreasing in a; in other words, the
larger is the bias towards the unemployed, the larger is the immediate impact of the shock
on ination and the smaller its delayed e¤ect on ination (for any given positive value of
). This is the case because unemployed households are borrowing-constrained and spend
all their additional nominal income in the current period; the new money they are given
is thus immediately reected into changes in the nominal price of goods. On the contrary,
employed households tend to save some of their additional nominal income for self-insurance
purposes, rather than spend it all on goods, leading to a delayed e¤ect on nominal prices.
Overall, money shocks are transmitted into nominal prices and ination all the more quickly
that the bias in favour of the unemployed rises.
4.4 Welfare considerations
Since the non-neutrality mechanism described in this paper relies on wealth redistribution
(both at the time of the shock and in the future), it directly a¤ects the welfare of every single
agent. There obviously are potential losers and winners from this wealth redistribution,
meaning that we should not in general expect monetary shocks to unambiguously produce
better or worse dynamic equilibria in the Pareto sense. For the sake of simplicity, we here
explore such welfare e¤ects in the context of symmetric money injections.
To analyse these welfare e¤ects further, recall from (26)(27) and (34) that all time-
t variables can be expressed as functions of the only state variable of the model, current
money growth  t, and that  t+1 only depends on  t. We focus on the dynamic and welfare
e¤ects of an once-o¤, unexpected aggregate shock, and call W i ( t) the maximum value
function of agent i when current money growth is  t:
W i ( t) = E
X1
k=0
k
 
u(ci ( t+k))  li ( t+k)
it;  t
= u(ci ( t))  li ( t) + E
 
W i ( t+1)
it;  t 
Let W i = @W
i ( t) =@ tj t= be the rst derivatives of this value function, evaluated at
the steady state, and recall from (33) that @ t+1=@ t = . Then, in the vicinity of the
steady state (i.e., where @W i ( t+1) =@ t+1 ' @W i ( t) =@ t = W i ), and given the transition
probabilities across employment statuses, the rst derivatives of the Bellman equations for
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each agent type are related as follows:
W ee =  
@lee ( t)
@ t

 t=
+ W ee + (1  ) W eu ;
W ue =  
@lue ( t)
@ t

 t=
+ W ee + (1  ) W eu ;
W eu =
@u (ceu ( t))
@ t

 t=
+ W uu + (1  ) W ue ;
W uu =
@u (cuu ( t))
@ t

 t=
+ W uu + (1  ) W ue :
The solution to this system expresses the rst derivatives of the four value functions as
(cumbersome) functions of the deep parameters of the model.8 The e¤ects of money growth
shocks on the intertemporal utility of individual households can easily be computed when 
is small. From the above system and equations (26)(28), when ! 0 (the i.i.d. case in the
limit) we have:
W ee !  meU= 2 < 0; W ue ! me (1  U) = 2 > 0;
W eu !  meUu0 (ceu) = 2 < 0; W uu ! me (1  U)u0 (cuu) = 2 > 0:
These latter equations state that utility always rises for households who benet from the
ination subsidy at the time of the shock (uu and ue households, i.e., those who hold no
cash at the beginning of the period), while those who pay for the ination tax (ee and eu
households, who are cash-rich at the beginning of the period) necessarily experience a welfare
loss. We cannot derive such clear-cut results on individualswelfare, however, outside of this
limiting case, due to the combined e¤ect of future expected redistribution and the transition
of households between employment states. For example, a households which currently su¤ers
from the ination tax (say, a ee household) may expect to benet from it in the future (if,
for example,  is low relative to ), making the overall welfare of this household a priori
ambiguous. (Conversely, a household which currently benets from the redistributive e¤ect
of ination may su¤er from it in the future if the probability of being cash-rich for su¢ ciently
many periods in the future is high).
8More specically, the solution to this system expresses the W i as functions of the @(:)=@ tjt= terms,
which latter can in turn be computed from equations (26)(27) and (34)
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5 Equilibria with n-state wealth distributions
Sections 3 and 4 have focused on the simplest possible cross-sectional wealth distribution,
with immediate asset liquidation by households who became unemployed. In this Section
we introduce richer distributions by letting households only gradually deplete their money
holding when unemployed. We start by explicitly constructing the class of three-wealth state
equilibria, and then describe more informally how the model can be generalised to handle
n-state cross-sectional distributions.
5.1 3 wealth states
Our conjectured equilibrium here is one in which households falling into unemployment take
two periods to entirely liquidate their real balances (i.e., partial liquidation occurs in the rst
period of unemployment). Just as in the two-wealth state case, all employed households hold
the same quantity of real money, denoted met , at the end of the current period, regardless of
their employment history. Unemployed households hold a quantity of money meut at the end
of the rst unemployment period and 0 at the end of the second unemployment period. This
equilibrium thus adds an additional layer of personal history which determines the household
types, relative to the two-state case: unemployed householdsmoney holdings now depend
on both the current and the two previous employment states, and hence so will the labour
supplies of employed households.
Formally, letting 'it be the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint faced by
household i, our conjectured equilibrium is such that:
'it = 0 if 
i
t = 1, '
i
t = 0 if
 
it; 
i
t 1

= (0; 1) , and mit = 0 if
 
it; 
i
t 1

= (0; 0)
Budget constraints. We can easily recover the budget constraints faced by each household
type in the economy under this conjecture, by proceeding in the same way as in Section 3.1
above for the two wealth states case. Provided that this equilibrium exists, it has exactly
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six types of agents, with (real) budget constraints:
ee : ce +met =
met 1
1 + t
+ leet + t (40)
eue : ce +met = l
eue
t +
meut 1
1 + t
+ t (41)
uue : ce +met = l
uue
t + t (42)
eu : ceut +m
eu
t =
met 1
1 + t
+ t +  (43)
euu : ceuut =
meut 1
1 + t
+ t +  (44)
uuu : cuuut = t +  (45)
In short, there are now three (rather two) types of unemployed households: eu households,
who were employed in the previous period, with beginning-of-period nominal balances of
M et 1 (i.e., m
e
t= (1 + t) in real terms) and end-of-period nominal balances M
eu
t (m
eu
t in real
terms); euu households, who became unemployed in the previous period, with beginning-of-
period nominal balances ofM eut 1 (m
eu
t 1= (1 + t) in real terms) and no end-of-period balances
(asset liquidation is total for them after two periods); and uuu households, who enter and
leave the period with no money wealth. By implication, there are also three types of employed
households, since the latter adjust their labour supply according to the wealth that they
inherited from their previous asset accumulation: ee households, who behave identically to
the two-state case; eue households, who leave unemployment with some real balances (i.e.,
meut 1= (1 + t)) left over from their previous employement, two periods beforehand; and uue
households, who enter employment with zero beginning-of-period wealth. These households
will supply leet , l
eue
t and l
uue
t units of labour at date t, respectively.
Asymptotic shares of households. Let ! be the column vector made of the asymptotic shares
of household types, in the same order as that for the budget constraints above, and 
 the
66 transition matrix across household types generated by the transition probabilities across
employment statuses. The invariant distribution of types satises !0
 = !0 which, after some
algebra, yields :
! =
2666666666664
!ee
!eue
!uue
!eu
!euu
!uuu
3777777777775
=
1
2    
2666666666664
 (1  )
(1  ) (1  )2
(1  ) (1  ) 
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) 
(1  ) 2
3777777777775
:
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Money demands. The two equations driving the dynamics of the model are: i) the Euler
equation characterising the real money demand of employed households (i.e., ee, eue and
uue households), who stay employed in the next period with probability  and become
unemployed with complementary probability; and ii) the Euler equation characterising the
real money demand of agents who have just become unemployed (i.e., eu households), who
stay unemployed with probability  and move back into employment with complementary
probability. From equations (43)(44) and the fact that u0 (ce) =  for employed households,
the real money demands satisfy the following relationships:
employed :  = Et


1 + t+1

+(1  ) Et

u0

met
1 + t+1
 meut+1 +  + t+1

1
1 + t+1

; (46)
eu : u0

met 1
1 + t
 meut +  + t

= (1  ) Et


1 + t+1

+Et

u0

meut
1 + t+1
+  + t+1

1
1 + t+1

: (47)
These two Euler equations will, together with the market clearing conditions that follow,
drive the dynamics of the three wealth state equilbrium.
Market clearing. The only di¤erence with the four-agent model here is that the market-
clearing conditions now include a larger set of household types. More specically, the clearing
of the goods and money markets now require, respectively,
!eeleet + !
uueluuet + !
eueleuet + U = (1  U) ce + !euceut + !euuceut + !uuucuuut ; (48)
!emet + !
eumeut = mt: (49)
For future reference, we now substitute (49) into (2) and use (3) to rewrite real money
injections and ination as functions of the two endogenous state variables, met and m
eu
t , and
the exogenous state variables,  t:
t = (!
emet + !
eumeut )

1  1
 t

; 1 + t =

!emet 1 + !
eumeut 1
!emet + !
eumeut

 t: (50)
Existence conditions. The existence conditions for this equilibrium are as follows. First,
neither employed households nor eu households must be borrowing constrained, i.e. they
must all be willing to save rather than borrow. It must thus be the case that, for all t,
met ; m
eu
t  0:
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Second, both euu and uuu households must be borrowing-constrained in equilibrium, i.e.,
their marginal utility of current consumption must be higher than their expected, discounted
marginal utility. We must thus have:
euu : u0

meut 1
1 + t
+ t + 

> (1  ) Et


1 + t+1

+ Et
 
u0
 
t+1 + 

1 + t+1
!
; (51)
uuu : u0

u0 (t + )
1 + t

> (1  ) Et


1 + t+1

+ Et
 
u0
 
t+1 + 

1 + t+1
!
: (52)
Again, since we are considering small uctuations occurring near the steady state, it is
su¢ cient to check that all four conditions hold with strict inequality in the steady state.
As we show in Appendix B, this also occurs when  belong to some non-empty interval: 
must be small enough to deter both euu and uuu households from saving for precautionary
purposes, while at the same time being large enough to induce positive self-insurance by
employed as well as eu-households. For the sake of simplicity, we carry out this analysis in
the zero-ination steady state, i.e., where  = 0 (by continuity, our existence conditions will
remain valid for small deviations of steady state ination from zero.)
Aggregate dynamics. Substituting (50) into (46)(47), one obtains a two-dimensional, nonlin-
ear backward/forward dynamic system with forcing sequence f tg1t=0 and solution sequences
fmetg1t=0 and fmeut g1t=0. Linearising this system around the zero-ination steady state, we
nd a dynamics of the form:
Et ( 1Xt 1 +  2Xt +  3Xt+1 +  4^ t +  5^ t+1) = 0; (53)
where Xt 
h
m^et m^
eu
t
i0
and where the  j, j = 1; :::; 5 are conformable matrices. As is well
known from the literature on expectational linear systems (e.g., Uhlig, 2001), the solution
to equation (53) has the following rst-order autoregressive representation:
Xt = PXt 1 +Q^ t; (54)
where the 22 matrix P and the 21 vector Q can be recovered from (53) using the method
of undetermined coe¢ cients. With t generated by Xt, Xt 1 and  t (see Eq. (50)) and Xt
given by (54), we can use Eqs. (40)(42) to infer the labour supplies of employed households
(i.e., leet ; l
uue
t and l
eue
t ), and then compute aggregate output using (48).
Panel B of Figure 1 plots impulse-response functions for the various variables of interest
to a money growth shock, under the same parameter conguration as that used for the
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two wealth state model.9 Although the overall output response to the shock looks similar
to that in the four-agent economy, it (unsurprisingly) masks a lot more heterogeneity at
the individual level; moreover, under our parametrisation the three-wealth state equilibrium
exhibits a much larger output response to a normalised money shock than the two-wealth
state equilbrium.
5.2 n > 3 wealth states
Extending the analysis to allow for more than three wealth states is straightforward (although
possibly tedious for large values of n). First, conjecture the existence of an equilibrium where
unemployed households become borrowing-constrained at the (n  1)th period of continuous
unemployment but not before, while employed households are never borrowing-constrained.
In this economy there are n 2 types of unconstrained unemployed households and 2 types of
constrained unemployed households; we thus end up with n wealth states, once the (unique)
end-of-period wealth level of the employed and the zero wealth level of the constrained
unemployed have been included in the state space. With n types of unemployed households
there is also n types of employed households: n 1 types corresponding to the di¤erent wealth
levels with which unemployed households may end the period (with the two unemployed
types ending the period with zero wealth generating only one type of employed household),
plus one type corresponding to those households who were already employed in the previous
period. An economy with n wealth states thus has 2n types of agents.
In this economy, the n   1 levels of positive real money holdings by the unconstrained
types are generated by the n   1 Euler equations characterising the behaviour of those
types. Formally, once the money market clearing condition is substituted into each Euler
equation, one obtains a (n  1)-dimensional dynamic system for n  1 sequences of positive
real balance levels that solve this system given the forcing sequence of money-growth shocks.
The approximate VAR representation of the solution vector can be recovered by linearising
this system and applying the method of undermined coe¢ cient. This ultimately yields an
expression similar to (54), but with Xt now being a (n  1)-dimensional vector of positive
end-of-period real money holdings, expressed as proportional deviations from the steady
state. Last, output is the weighted sum of the n levels of labour supply by the di¤erent
9Here we still impose that  = 0:9:+, but + is now given by (B3) in Appendix B, rather than (A2) in
Appendix A. Then we check numerically that 0:9:+ >  , and that the equilibrium generated by (53) is
determinate and thus unique.
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types of employed households, which are in turn determined as residuals from their budget
constraints.
The conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with n wealth state are reasonably
simple to check. First,  must be su¢ ciently low so that in the steady state the real balances
held by households who have been unemployed for n  2 periods is non-negative (i.e., these
households are not borrowing-constrained); since unemployed households gradually deplete
their wealth, this implies that all households which have been unemployed for fewer than
n 2 periods are also unconstrained. Second,  must be su¢ ciently large so that households
are borrowing constrained at the (n  1)th period of continuous unemployment; since all
households with more than n  1 periods of continuous unemployment hold zero beginning-
of-period real balances (i.e., they hold strictly less than households having experienced only
n   1 periods of unemployment), all such households are also borrowing-constrained along
the n-wealth level equilibrium. That there always exists a range of  satisfying both condi-
tions follows from the fact that, for any value of  and under the conjectured equilibrium,
households entering their (n  2)th period of continuous unemployment have strictly greater
beginning-of-period wealth than those entering their (n  1)th unemployment period.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has modelled some dynamic and welfare e¤ects of aggregate monetary shocks in
a Bewley-type monetary model with idiosyncratic labour income risk. We have shown that
money-growth shocks that contemporary redistribute real money wealth across agents tend
to raise output (through the intratemporal ination tax), but also that this direct e¤ect
can be o¤set by the e¤ect of expected future redistribution on the real demand for cash
(i.e., through the intertemporal ination tax). Finally, the fact that wealth is redistributed
both at the time of the shock and in the future (provided that money growth variations
are persistent), combined with the perpetual transitions of households across employment
statuses and cash-holding levels, implies that the welfare e¤ects of monetary shocks are in
general ambiguous (in the Pareto sense.)
The inherent complexity of Bewley-type models with both idiosyncratic and aggregate
uncertainty, which results from the very large number of agent types that these models
typically involve, is notorious and may have hindered their use (see the discussion in Kehoe
and Levine, 2001). Our response to this challenge has been to construct, and then to
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focus on, a class of closed-form equilibria with a small number of wealth states and thus
limited household heterogeneity. We considered the simplest class of equilibria featuring
cross-sectional heterogeneity (i.e., equilibria with two wealth states and four agent types) to
derive our results and discuss the two e¤ects that ultimately determine the sign slope of the
output-ination tradeo¤. We also showed how our framework could be extended to handle
richer classes of equilibria whilst maintaining analytical tractability. The relative simplicity
of our heterogenous agents framework may make it a useful tool for the better understanding
of the e¤ects of other macroeconomic shocks (e.g., scal policy shocks) in economies with
incomplete markets.
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Appendix A: Steady state of the two-wealth state model
We use variables without time indices here to indicate steady-state values. From Eqs. (2)-(3),
steady-state ination and real transfers are 1 +  =  and  = m= (1 + ), respectively
(and since  t >  8t by assumption, we have that  >  and  >    1.) Substituting
these values into (15) and using (21), we nd that the steady-state real money holdings of
employed households, me, are:
me =
1 + 
1 + (1  U)

u0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

  

:
The values of cuu, ceu, lee, lue and y are then straightforward to derive. For example,
ceu = u0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

: (A1)
Since we consider uctuations which are arbitrarily close to the steady state, a su¢ cient
condition for our closed-form solution to be an equilibrium is that both (22) and (24) hold
with strict inequalities in the steady state. From (28), the rst condition is simply:
 < u0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

 +: (A2)
In the steady state, the left-hand side of (24) is ceu. Using (A1), inequality (24) becomes:
(1 + ) (1 +    )
(1  )    (1  )  >


u0 ( + ) : (A3)
In the steady state,  = (1  U)me= (1 + ) (see Eqs. (2) and (21)). Substituting  into
(A3), using Eq. (28) and rearranging, we may rewrite the latter inequality as:
(1 + ) (1 +    )
(1  )    (1  )  >


u0


1 + (1  U) +
(1  U)
1 + (1  U)u
0 1

(1 +    )
(1  ) 

: (A4)
The left-hand side of (A4) is positive at  =    1 and thus for all  >    1. The
right-hand side of (A4) is decreasing and continuous in  over [0;1). Thus, if (A4) holds at
 = +, then by continuity there exists   < + such that (A4) holds for all  >  . Setting
 = + in (A4) and rearranging, we have:
(1 +    ) (1 +    )  (1  ) (1  ) 2 > 0; (A5)
which is always true whenever  >    1.
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Section 4.1 referred to the comparative-static result that steady-state ination decreases
with mean ination. To show this, note that a su¢ cient condition for @me=@ < 0 is that
@ (1 + )u0 1 ((1 +    ) = (1  ) )
@ (1 + )
< 0:
Since from (A1) u0 1 ((1 +    )= (1  ) ) = ceu, this condition may be written as:
ceu + (1 + )= (1  ) u00 (ceu) < 0;
or, after rearranging,  (ceu) < (1 + ) = (1 +    ). This is always true since  (c)  1 8c
by assumption.
Appendix B: Steady state of the three-wealth state model
Around the zero-ination steady state we have that t = t = 0 at all dates. The steady-state
counterparts of Eqs. (46)(47) are thus, respectively,
 = + (1  ) u0 (me  meu + ) ;
u0 (me  meu + ) = (1  ) + u0 (meu + ) :
Combining these two equations, we obtain the following steady-state levels of real money
holdings by eu and employed households:
meu = u0 1



1  
(1  ) 2 + 1 
1


   (B1)
me = u0 1

 (1  )
(1  ) 

+meu    (B2)
Our existence conditions are that me;meu > 0 (for small shocks, this will ensure that
meut ;m
e
t  0 for all t, as required), and that inequalities (51)(52) hold in the steady state.
From (B1), meu > 0 if and only if:
(1  )
(1  ) 2 + 1 
1

<
u0 ()

: (B3)
Note that if (B3) holds, then it is also the case that me > 0, since from (B2) we have
that me > meu if and only if
(1  )
(1  )  <
u0 ()

;
which is always true under condition (B3).
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Since ceuut > c
uuu
t we have that u
0 (cuuut ) > u
0 (ceuut ). Thus, if inequality (51) holds then
so does (52). The steady-state counterpart of (51) is:
u0 (meu + ) > (1  ) + u0 () ;
or, using (B1) to substitute meu out and rearranging,
(1  )
(1  ) 23 +

  1


1

+ 1

>
u0 ()

: (B4)
Inequality (B3) denes +, the maximum amount of home production above which eu
households would no longer nd it worthwhile to save. Inequality (B4) denes  , the
minimum amount of home production below which euu households would prefer to save,
rather than borrow. There exist a range of  satisfying both (B3) and (B4) if and only if
the right hand side of (B4) is larger than the left hand side of (B3). After rearranging, this
turns out to be the case if and only if:
(1  ) (1  )  (1  ) (1  ) 2 > 0; (B5)
which is always true (note that inequality (B5) is equivalent to (A5) with  = 0:)
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